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“[A]t the heart of the Irish economy has always been the philosophy of
tax competitiveness. Tax competitiveness has taken [Ireland] out of
poverty . . . . It has been a successful policy . . . . [It] is why Ireland has
stayed afloat.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Ireland is well known for many things that give the country an indelible
place in the hearts of people around the world. Irish authors and poets like
George Bernard Shaw, Oscar Wilde, Maeve Binchy, James Joyce, and
Seamus Heaney are common focal points in western education and have
greatly aided the progression of modern literature over the last 200 years.
Musicians and bands from Sinead O’Connor to U2, Hozier, and Thin
Lizzy have brought a fusion of Irish culture to stages and music charts
across the globe. Brands like Jameson, Guinness, Kerrygold, and Ryanair
continue to be of use to consumers around the world. Irish pubs are open
and popular watering holes for locals and expats alike in cities from San
Diego to Kathmandu. Thanks to one of the largest and “most prominent
significant dispersals of populations in European history,” Ireland’s
indomitable spirit remains alive and thriving, despite having a population
of less than 5 million people.2
However, the economic prosperity of Ireland has not ascended in unison
with the worldliness of Irish culture and the global growth of positive Irish
sentiment.3 Ireland’s economic fortunes have instead remained “an unfortunate
embarrassment to be whispered about in dark corners”4 until the late 20th
century when, after nearly 700 years of subjugation at the hands of AngloNorman Britons,5 the Republic of Ireland experienced its first major socioeconomic turn around in the mid-1990s.6

1. Tim Adams, Bono: ‘There’s a Difference Between Cosying up to Power and
Being Close to Power’, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2013, 7:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.
com/music/2013/sep/22/bono-campaigner-u2-global-poverty [https://perma.cc/8MJP-NT4S].
2. Enda Delaney, The Irish Diaspora, 33 IRISH ECON. & SOC. HIST. 35, 35–38
(2006).
3. The terms “Republic of Ireland” and “Ireland” will be used at length throughout this
Comment and are meant to be interchangeable in the context of this Comment; both
reference the sovereign state of the Republic of Ireland. Any reference to Northern Ireland will
be referenced as “Northern Ireland” and not “United Kingdom.”
4. Delaney, supra note 2, at 38.
5. Gavin Stamp, Neighbours Across the Sea: A Brief History of Anglo-Irish Relations.
BBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-26883211 [https://perma.
cc/8GF8-NMDL].
6. Sean Dorgan, How Ireland Became the Celtic Tiger, THE HERITAGE FOUND.
(June 23, 2006), https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/how-ireland-became-the-celtictiger [https://perma.cc/ZU3N-HTKX].
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The booming Celtic Tiger economy of the mid-1990s through the mid2000s provided a quick glimpse into the potential benefits of modern
globalization and put Ireland on the world stage as a model of how a
formerly-colonial society can transform itself into a high-tech, high-income
society.7 Ireland’s perceived role as a champion of harnessing globalization
for the better of its people, however, remains speculative at best.8 Rapidly
increasing social inequality is challenging Ireland’s ability to maintain
steady economic growth.9
Some scholars theorize that Ireland’s economic boom is resulting in
growing “social polarization between those who are benefiting from it and
those being marginalized by it.”10 After hundreds of years of societal stagnation
at the hands of a colonial power, Ireland now faces societal stagnation
thanks to its government’s prioritization of inequitable economic growth
over the need to congruently develop its internal economy to increase the
citizens’ quality of life and social equity.11
Ireland’s initial ascent from agrarian society to the Celtic Tiger and its
subsequent descent into socioeconomic stagnation came about thanks in
major part to Ireland’s corporate tax structure. Ireland’s highly agrarian
economy of the early-to-mid 20th century was not allowed to take part in
the international industrial revolution between 1820 and 1840 because of
England’s oppressive policies towards Irish economic growth.12 However,
once Ireland found its first opportunity to embark on an independent path
of economic policy in the 1980s, it found a direct and attractive fast-cash
outlet through the harnessing of foreign direct investment by way of tax
incentives.13
Despite some limited ebbs and flows, the Republic of Ireland’s overarching
corporate tax policy since the 1950s has centered on attracting direct foreign

7. Id.
8. Colin Coulter et al., Austerity’s Model Pupil: The Ideological Uses of Ireland
During the Eurozone Crisis, 45 CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 697, 697–98 (2017).
9. Id.
10. Paul Kirby, THE CELTIC TIGER IN DISTRESS: GROWTH WITH INEQUALITY IN IRELAND
4–5 (2016).
11. Id. at 5.
12. See Aidan Walsh & Chris Sanger, The Historical Development and International
Context of the Irish Corporate Tax System., ERNST & YOUNG 3 (2014), https://eyfinancial
servicesthoughtgallery.ie/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Historical-Development-andInternational-Context-of-the-Irish-corporate-tax-system-2.pdf.
13. Id. at 5.
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investment.14 This policy, however, has affected highly unequal economic
growth favoring business and corporate interests15 and, after two inelastic
economic recessions, is still the reigning policy in use in Ireland. The
changing landscape of tax competition and policy in the United States and
Europe, along with an increase in anti-tax competition sentiment from the
European Union, has shown that Ireland’s stagnant corporate tax policy
has reached a state of rapidly diminishing returns.16 Once a harbinger of
the “good times”17 and a praised economic performer amongst capitalist
societies in the western world,18 Ireland’s current corporate tax scheme has
morphed into an example of the gripping power tax manipulation holds
over Irish revenue and financial policy.
The Republic of Ireland’s current use of corporate tax policy will be
discussed at further length below. While this Comment will include an
explanation of the socioeconomic consequences created by the Republic
of Ireland’s continued use of a low corporate tax rate, it is not intended to
vilify businesses, their practice, or the corporate search for the most
efficient methods of tax avoidance; this is conduct universal to businesses
and corporations.
Rather, this Comment argues that Ireland must break from its current
corporate tax law to implement a modernized tax strategy that adequately
provides for economic revenue beyond the historic pandering to corporate

14. See Frank Barry & Clare O’Mahony, Regime Change in 1950s Ireland: The
New Export-Oriented Foreign Investment Strategy, 44 IRISH ECON. & SOC. HIST. 46, 47
(2017) (“The new foreign direct investment (FDI) regime was initiated by the inter-party
governments of the era: the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) was established by
the first Costello government in 1949, while the crucial financial incentives to support the new
regime were introduced by the second inter-party government in 1956.”).
15. See generally NAT O’CONNOR & CORMAC STAUNTON, CHERISHING ALL EQUALLY:
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN IRELAND (John Baker et. al., eds., 2015), http://www.tasc.ie/
assets/files/pdf/tasc_cherishing_all_equally_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/35UM-VFYM].
16. Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 20.
17. The “good times” is an Irish colloquialism referring to the limited periods in
independent Irish history when the economy has been good enough for families to not
have to pinch their pocketbooks. (“Economists are coming on television now telling us
Irish people that we fucked up the good times by spending all our money. That’s what we were
supposed to do, that’s why they were called ‘the good times’! You can’t be saving your
money during the good times. If you did then it would be called the ‘in preparation for the
bad times,’ times.”). TOMMY TIERNAN, What Recession?, on LIVE IN NEW YORK (Mabinog
Ltd. 2011).
18. Antoin E. Murphy, The ‘Celtic Tiger’ – An Analysis of Ireland’s Economic Growth
Performance, 3 (Eur. Univ. Inst. Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, Working
Paper No. 16, 2000), https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/1656/00_16.pdf?sequence
=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/JPK2-A3VF] (“Less than ten years later the Economist
highlighted Ireland on its front cover with the title ‘Europe’s shining light’. In the lead
editorial it remarked: ‘Just yesterday, it seems, Ireland was one of Europe’s poorest countries.
Today it is about as prosperous as the European average, and getting richer all the time’.”).
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entities in a search for foreign direct investment. The Republic of Ireland
should apply tax policy that balances internal and external business needs
to decrease dependency on investment from American corporations seeking
refuge from European tax schemes. A new tax regime, implemented with
an eye on long-term sector growth and societal investment, has the potential
to modernize Ireland’s socioeconomic structure to capitalize on the already
existing pool of Irish-borne tech, biotech, financial, and data-driven companies
looking for an opportunity to become prominent fixtures of the Irish economy.
This Comment starts by providing a historical overview of Irish corporate
tax policy and the significant role it played in bringing the country up to
economic strength with other economies in Western Europe. Then, it explains
the current state of Ireland’s corporate tax code and explores influential
legislation in the European Union and the United States governing their
respective approaches to tax competition and tax harmonization. This is
done to more clearly juxtapose the Irish government’s outdated, yet continuing
maintenance of the country’s tax haven status with changes in international tax
enforcement and corporate tax policy that further diminish the financial
and political returns of maintaining an overtly low corporate tax rate.
Lastly, this Comment suggests remedies for the inadequacies of the
current tax system to create financial returns that are at least more proportionate
to the current amount of aid given to corporate investors and quell rising
negative sentiment from the European Commission. Ireland should take
steps towards corporate tax reform by either (a) closing profit-shifting
loopholes and applying a uniform effective tax rate, or (b) working with
the European Union to achieve effective and minimally damaging tax
harmonization that would not dissuade major companies from foregoing
the Irish business development market.
This Comment is not written as a call to action for the Republic of
Ireland to reassert the protectionist measures implemented by Éamon de
Valera in the 1950s.19 Nor is it a call for the destruction of the vast and
sometimes beneficial bilateral tax treaty network Ireland has cultivated.20
Proposals here-in, while critical of Fianna Fáil’s and Fine Gael’s 40-year
adherence to the status quo, are not partisan motivated. Rather, they are
intended to show Ireland has an opportunity to make a significant and
19. See Joe Durkin, Seán Lemass and the Nadir of Protectionism, 41.3 THE ECON.
& SOC. REV. 269, 277 (2010), https://www.esr.ie/ESR_papers/vol41_3/03-durkan.pdf.
20. Gary Tobin & Keith Walsh, What Makes a Country a Tax Haven? An Assessment
of International Standards Shows Ireland is Not a Tax Haven, 44.3 THE ECON. & SOC.
REV. 401, 421 (2013).
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historic step forward in its independence and growth as a relatively young
nation. The time for adherence to a stagnant state of economic affairs is
over; the potential for equitable Irish economic growth is palpable.
A. The Rise of Irish Tax Competition
The history of Ireland’s economic growth strategy, and integrally its
corporate tax strategy, to date, is necessary to understand the context of
this Comment. To refrain from overanalyzing nearly 100 years of strategy
since Ireland’s independence, this Comment’s historical analysis relies on
scholarly and legal writings to provide a concise and accurate scope of
how, and why, Ireland finds itself in its current socioeconomic state.
Ireland adopted the tax code of the United Kingdom in near-verbatim
fashion after establishing independence in 1922,21 implementing a small,
yet historically prominent income tax that became the foundation for the
Irish corporation tax.22 In the late 1950s, Irish foreign policy shifted from
an unsuccessful and overtly stagnant protectionist approach towards a more
globally inclusive plan of national conduct.23 This historic shift marked
the first time Ireland was opened to influencing, and being influenced by,
the global economy in a meaningful way.24 In fact, the Irish government
largely based their foreign policy objectives on goals similar to the many
countries of Western Europe that were benefiting from the drastic, globalizationdriven economic growth of the post-World War II Marshall plan era.25
Although the income tax adopted in 1922 was liberalized in the late
1950s to cover business income, Ireland did not hesitate to provide tax
relief to manufacturing and export-focused companies.26 Beginning humbly
in 1956 as relief for profits earned over companies’ 1956 base profits, Ireland
expanded the scope of this relief to allow manufacturing and exportfocused companies to take advantage of export sales relief (“ESR”).27 In
essence, ESR precluded all profits from exports manufactured in Ireland
from income tax, including the tax returns received from refunds given to
companies after tax filings.28
21. Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 4.
22. Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 4–5.
23. Barry & O’Mahony, supra note 14, at 46.
24. Barry & O’Mahony, supra note 14, at 50–52.
25. Although “US foreign policy interests clearly played a significant part in shaping
the agenda in Ireland—as elsewhere in Western Europe,” Ireland did not fully agree with
the US’s idea of Ireland becoming a large food exporter and gradually moved Marshall
Aid money into Irish industrial sectors rather than food production. Barry & O’Mahony,
supra note 14, at 52–53.
26. Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 4.
27. Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 4–5.
28. Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 4–5.
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This relief ushered in a new era of unprecedented growth in Ireland.29
In the 1960s, “foreign companies set up 350 new enterprises in Ireland:
British, American, German and Dutch. Among the early arrivals—and still
here today—were Denmark’s Leo Laboratories (1959), Warner-Lambert
(1960), General Electric (1963) and Pfizer (1969).”30 Foreign direct investment
drove the overwhelming majority of this growth, fueling 70% of Ireland’s
new employment as well as 90% of the country’s new export goods and
materials.31
Ireland’s corporate sector growth through the 1960s allowed the government,
specifically the Industrial Development Authority (“IDA”), to begin
identifying and prioritizing Ireland’s top performing industrial sectors.32
Importantly, this early identification came before these companies, mainly
focused in the electronics, pharmaceuticals, and biotech industries, became
“more widely known and attractive to other development agencies” in
other countries.33 Furthermore, this early identification of key sectors
started a trend in Irish policy towards pampering business interests:
Projects considered particularly worthy came from companies that were leaders
in their field, were high-tech, highly skilled and offered long-term growth potential,
used the country’s natural resources, presented spin-off prospects to existing
firms, provided jobs quickly, located in less developed parts of the country and
helped sell Ireland as an [foreign direct investment] location.34

In 1976, the Irish government codified its focus on business attraction in
the Corporation Tax Act. Not only did the act grandfather ESR until 1990,35
but it also laid an “effective 10% corporate tax rate [beginning January 1,
1981] for trading manufacturing profits . . . .”36 Plus, the government expanded
the definition of ‘manufacturing’ to, importantly, include internet and
29. Paul Donnelly, How Foreign Firms Transformed Ireland’s Domestic Economy,
IRISH TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013, 01:00 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/howforeign-firms-transformed-ireland-s-domestic-economy-1.1593462 [https://perma.cc/
U64V-ZLNW].
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Ireland joined the European Union by resounding national approval 1973. European
Union, EU member countries in brief, europa.eu, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/
countries/member-countries/ireland_en [https://perma.cc/H4TJ-4R47]; ERS quickly ran
afoul of the European Union’s rules governing preferential business treatment and was
grandfathered until 1990. Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 5.
36. Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 5.
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financial services and activities in Dublin’s International Financial Services
Centre.37
Eventually, the ESR’s complete exclusion of export profits was removed
in compliance with European Union requirements and replaced with a
base erosion profit sharing (“BEPS”) system allowing for an actual tax
rate below only half of38 the advertised 12.5% effective rate.39
This growth continued through the 2000s with the further attraction of
high-tech companies and, eventually, a newly emergent financial services
sector.40 Ireland grew to be one of the most “prosperous” countries in
Western Europe41 attributable to more than 40 years of effective business
attraction; Ireland’s GDP grew from less than $50 billion U.S.D. in 1980
to over $380 billion U.S.D. in 2019.42
However, the economic growth and relative stability that once signified
Ireland’s rise from the depths of poverty, 43 now raises questions as to
whether Ireland is truly prosperous, or has disillusioned the world through
over-reliance on purposely inflated financial figures.44 In reality, wages
still are “sluggish,” actual living conditions are not seeing proportional
improvement, and housing is unaffordable and undersupplied.45 As will
be discussed below, Ireland’s corporate tax system has stopped being a
37. Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 5.
38. Frank Barry, Aggressive Tax Planning Practices and Inward FDI Implications
for Ireland of the New US Corporate Tax Regime, 50 THE ECON. & SOC. REV. 325, 331
(2019); Tom Bergin, Global tax deal leaves billion-dollar loopholes Reuters analysis
finds, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/global-tax-deal-leavesbillion-dollar-loopholes-reuters-analysis-finds-2021-12-03/ [https://perma.cc/VZ73-ZYSL].
39. Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 5.
40. Donnelly, supra note 29.
41. Cliodhna Russell, Most Prosperous Countries in the World Revealed: Ireland
Ranked Above Germany, UK and US, THEJOURNAL.IE (Nov. 2, 2015, 5:44 PM) https://
www.thejournal.ie/ireland-prosperous-global-index-2421951-Nov2015 [https://perma.cc/
BVG4-CRM2].
42. Ireland GDP, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/ireland/gdp [https://
perma.cc/7RLE-7PLW].
43. Murphy, supra note 18, at 4 (“Less than ten years later the Economist
highlighted Ireland on its front cover with the title ‘Europe’s shining light’. In the lead
editorial it remarked: ‘Just yesterday, it seems, Ireland was one of Europe’s poorest
countries. Today it is about as prosperous as the European average, and getting richer all
the time’.”).
44. Eoin Burke-Kennedy, Is Ireland’s booming economy just an illusion?, IRISH
TIMES (Mar. 30, 2018 06:35 AM) https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/is-ireland- sbooming-economy-just-an-illusion-1.3444645 [https://perma.cc/B9C6-T7WC]; Figures
regarding ideas like “prosperity” are often measured objectively by economists and other
types of numeric analysts, often times not taking into account the actual state of living
within the country. See Maura Stephens, Ireland’s prosperity trap, OPENDEMOCRACY
(Mar. 22, 2006), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/prosperity_trap_3379jsp/ [https://
perma.cc/PP9V-P9TH].
45. Burke-Kennedy, supra note 44.
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beneficial tool for Ireland’s growth and has instead created an illusion that
the country is operating an equitable system benefiting the country’s coffers
for the better of the Irish people. In actuality, the decades-long adherence
to attracting foreign business is no longer helping the country achieve its
potential.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
The law applicable to the content of this Comment is complex and spans
three countries and a geopolitical union. The Irish corporate tax code itself
contains nearly 40 years of amendments and is difficult to parse, at best.
To effectively analyze the Irish tax code itself, this Comment relies on
scholarly and legal writings outside of the written code that accurately and
concisely explain the sheer volume of legislative text.
A. A Look at the Irish Tax Code
Understanding the current state of Ireland’s corporate tax policy
requires looking into the tax code itself. A look at the Irish tax code not
only provides historical context into how tax policy turned into legal
codification, but also shows how Ireland has changed its tax avoidance
schemes to keep up with modern regulations and loophole closures.
In the late 1990s, the Oireachtas, Ireland’s bicameral legislative body,
signed into law the Taxes Consolidation Act of 1997 (“TCA”)46 and the
Finance Act of 1999,47 bringing together the country’s bodies of legislation
on income tax, corporation tax, and securities/investment tax into two
cohesive vehicles of legislation. The TCA and Finance Act codified a
decades-long strategy by the Irish government to attract foreign direct
investment (“FDI”) through the enticement of a low headline corporate
tax rate.48

46. Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 (Act No. 37/1997) (Ir.), § 23(A)(1)a, http://www.
irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1997/act/39/enacted/en/pdf.
47. Finance Act, 1999 (Act No. 2/1999) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/
1999/act/2/enacted/en/pdf.
48. Barry & O’Mahony, supra note 14, at 51 (“The IDA, the DEAC and Coras
Trachtala would all support the department’s proposals for export profits tax relief (or
‘export sales relief’)—the origin of Ireland’s low corporation tax regime. The measure was
eventually introduced by the second inter-party government, in the face of continuing
opposition from the Department of Finance, in 1956.”).
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Specifically, Section 21 of the TCA set the general rate of corporation
tax at 12.5% for all trading companies,49 one of Europe’s lowest.50 In
Ireland’s case, trading refers to profits earned on the island of Ireland
through business transactions and is not specifically related to investment
trading.51 The TCA and Finance Acts were continuations of reductions in
headline corporate profit taxation underway in Ireland since 1976.52 In the
nearly twenty-five years between 1976 and the turn of the century, the tax
levied on corporate profit dropped from a highly protectionist 50% to its
current 12.5%,53 largely due to expansion of the “manufacturing” definition
in the tax code to cover financial services rather than traditionally
manufactured goods.54
In addition to formally lowering the headline tax rate, the acts also addressed
special tax considerations for corporate profits from businesses in specialized
sectors.55 The broadly defined manufacturing sector enjoyed a new 10%
rate on profits traded in Ireland, which was eventually phased out to 12.5%
in 2003.56 Most notably, the acts created a set of special circumstances for
profits related to sales of intellectual property (including software, biotech,
technological processing machines, app revenues, and informations technology),
all of which were specifically designated to use a smaller-than-headline
rate of 2.5 to 4.5% based on a system of base erosion profit-shifting.57
An understanding of the sheer importance of the base erosion profit
shifting system to Ireland requires insight into how BEPS schemes operate
and how they allow corporations to avoid paying corporate tax in states
with higher headline rates. The following explanation is undoubtedly a
simplified detailing of the mechanics of Ireland’s BEPS tools, but it illustrates
the process through which Ireland conducts its overt tax avoidance scheme.
Additionally, it also shows how the Irish government has changed different

49. Irish Tax and Customs Revenue, SI 02-02-06, Tax and Duty Manual, § 2.2
(February 2021), https://www.revenue.ie/en/tax-professionals/tdm/income-tax-capital-gainstax-corporation-tax/part-02/02-02-06.pdf.
50. Corporate Tax Rate Table, KPMG (2011-2021), https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/
home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html
[https://perma.cc/3DD5-3QNN].
51. Irish Tax and Customs Revenue, supra note 49, at § 2.2, https://www.revenue.
ie/en/tax-professionals/tdm/income-tax-capital-gains-tax-corporation-tax/part-02/02-0206.pdf.
52. Julia Blue, The Celtic Tiger Roars Defiantly: Corporation Tax in Ireland and
Competition Within the European Union, DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 443, 456–57 (1999).
53. Id. at 455.
54. Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 5.
55. Blue, supra note 52, at 456.
56. Blue, supra note 52, at 456.
57. GOV’T OF IR., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL, REPORT ON
THE ACCOUNTS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE (2016).
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aspects of its schemes over the last 30 years in order to stay away from
regulatory trouble.
1. Double Irish, Single Malt, and the Green Jersey: Base Erosion and
Profit Sharing Under Irish Law
Since the early 1990’s, Ireland’s tax system has utilized some variation
of a BEPS tool to attract FDI from multinational corporations.58 Base erosion
refers to the practice of reducing the taxable base of a company’s taxable
profits59 by decreasing the amount of profits a company claims to have
earned in one country.60 This reduction of a company’s taxable profit base
is accomplished through profit-shifting, a practice of shifting taxable profits
from high-tax countries to low-tax countries.61
This is possible because of a “a fundamental design flaw of the
international tax regime: the ‘arm’s length standard’, which states that
[multinational corporations] should value the intra-firm transactions between
different subsidiaries as if they were being handled with a third independent
party at market prices.”62 In other words, shifting profits between a company’s
own subsidiaries is legal under an international presumption that subsidiaries,
even wholly-owned subsidiaries, are to be interacted with as separate
third-party companies whose transactions with the parent company are
conducted at reasonable market prices.63

58. While there is not an exact date provided for the beginning of Ireland’s BEPS
tool, Apple is known to have used it as early as 1991 thanks to a report from the Irish
Revenue Commissioner clarifying Apple’s use of the tool under Irish law. Rogerio M
Fernandes Ferreira, INSIGHT: The Apple Case Decision in Perspective, BLOOMBERG
TAX (Aug. 26, 2020), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-international/insight-theapple-case-decision-in-perspective [https://perma.cc/KG3X-G3CS]. Google has also used the
BEPS tool within the last three years without despite Ireland’s supposed closure of the
original BEPS mechanics. Peter Bodkin, Two years after the ‘double Irish’ was shelved, Google
used it to shift billions to Bermuda, THEJOURNAL.IE (Dec. 1, 2018), https://www.the journal.
ie/google-ireland-tax-3-3-4367701-Dec2018/ [https://perma.cc/B2XY-RQRY].
59. What is BEPS, TRANSFER PRICING ASIA (Jan. 29, 2017), https://transferpricing
asia.com/2017/01/29/what-is-beps/ [https://perma.cc/6UGC-P6JP].
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Wouter Lips, Great Powers in Global Tax Governance: A Comparison of the
US Role in the CRS and BEPS, GLOBALIZATIONS, 4 (2018), https://files.osf.io/v1/resources/
ewd3j/providers/osfstorage/5d9c9b73fcf91f00121a3068?action=download&direct&versi
on=1 [https://perma.cc/9EV8-HC5C].
63. See id.
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In Ireland’s case, this profit-shifting is not the end of the proverbial road
for a company’s profit. Once a multinational company’s profit is shifted
to Ireland, the corporation then uses Ireland’s renowned and extensive set
of bilateral tax treaties64 to further shift that profit to a third country with
a low-to-zero percent corporate tax. This last tax haven is where the
corporation’s profit is finally reported as income and subjected to a headline
tax rate.65
Take, for example, the following hypothetical. Say that Google uses
Ireland’s BEPS tool to avoid paying corporation tax on profit generated
in another EU country with a relatively high corporation tax rate. Google’s
American headquarters creates a web services program and subsequently
sells the IP rights for that program to its Bermudian subsidiary, Google
Bermuda. Google Bermuda then licenses its Irish based subsidiary, Google
Ireland, to sell the program in Ireland. Then, Google Ireland licenses Google
Germany to sell in the program in Germany.
A customer buys Google’s program in Germany for €100. Selling IPrelated products requires minimal overhead, so Google Germany earns €95
per sale of an individual program. Using the arm’s length standard, Google
shifts this German-derived profit to Google Ireland as a royalty payment
for Google Germany’s licensing agreement. Because it is IP-related profit,
Google Ireland only incurs a 2.5% to 4.5% tax in accordance with the TCA
and Finance Act on any profits held in Ireland.66 Once in Ireland, Google
Ireland then uses Ireland’s complete tax treaty with Bermuda to shift the
remaining profit to Google Bermuda. Most of the €95 profit originally made
in Germany at the beginning of the transaction will finish its journey as
reportable Bermudan income subject to Bermuda’s zero-tax jurisdiction.67
This legal abuse of the Irish tax code and international norms of corporate
tax policy provides Ireland with some revenue from corporate tax, but the
scheme(s) shielded huge volumes of taxable profits being shifted through
the country.68
64. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ireland’s Foreign tax relief and tax treaties,
WORLDWIDE TAX SUMMARIES (last reviewed Aug. 12, 2020), https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/
ireland/individual/foreign-tax-relief-and-tax-treaties [https://perma.cc/MN3D-TJK6].
65. Id.
66. What is BEPS, supra note 59.
67. See Joseph Brothers, From the Double Irish to the Bermuda Triangle, TAX
ANALYSTS 687-95 (Nov. 24, 2014), https://sven-giegold.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/
From-Double-Irish-to-Bermuda-Triangle-2014.pdf. Both Bermuda and the Cayman Islands
were/are popular final zero-tax destinations for profit originally generated in the European
Union. See id. at 692.
68. Jannick Damgaard, Thomas Elkjaer & Niels Johannesen, The Rise of Phantom
Investments, 56.3 FIN. & DEV. 11, 12 (Sept. 2019), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
fandd/2019/09/pdf/the-rise-of-phantom-FDI-in-tax-havens-damgaard.pdf. Stephen Holland,
How Ireland became one of the World’s biggest tax havens, INDEPENDENT.IE (Dec. 4,
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Ireland’s ‘double Irish’ BEPS tool, however, has been discontinued in
its original form in compliance with European Union (“EU”) regulation.
“Over the past years Ireland has implemented significant changes in domestic
legislation and adopted and implemented recommendations from the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)
which have closed or significantly restricted the ability of companies to
use tax planning structures similar to [BEPS].”69
Rather than acquiesce to EU regulation, Ireland’s corporate tax hydra
has brought two successors into the void left by the closure of the ‘double
Irish’ tool: the aptly named ‘Single Malt’70 and ‘Green Jersey’ systems.71
The ‘Single Malt’ mimics the structure of the ‘double Irish’ system but changes
the end destination of the transaction to a tax haven whose bilateral treaty
with Ireland states that the money being shifted is for “managerial and control”
purposes.72 The immediacy with which ‘Single Malt’ arose dashed hopes
of complete abolition of the ‘double Irish’ tool.73 Regardless of its technical
legality, Ireland closed one of its two ‘Single Malt’ loopholes in and joint
announcement with Maltese Financial authorities; Ireland’s bilateral tax
treaty with the United Arab Emirates still allows for this system.74
2021), https://www.independent.ie/regionals/sligochampion/business/how-ireland-becameone-of-the-worlds-biggest-tax-havens-41117761.html [https://perma.cc/UZ8U-MEQ8]
(“The Double Irish tax tool first used in the late 1980s was the largest tax avoidance tool
in history and by 2010 it was shielding $100 billion annually in US multinational foreign
profits from taxation.”).
69. Cormac Doyle, INSIGHT: The Apple Case—Where Are We Now?, BLOOMBERG
TAX (Aug. 3, 2020), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-international/insightthe-apple-case-where-are-we-now [https://perma.cc/VK9C-2GRE].
70. Dominic Coyle, Multinationals turn from ‘Double Irish’ to ‘Single Malt’ to avoid
tax in Ireland, THE IRISH TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/
economy/multinationals-turn-from-double-irish-to-single-malt-to-avoid-tax-in-ireland1.3290649 [https://perma.cc/5YUS-T2WW].
71. Emma Clancy, Apple, Ireland and The New Green Jersey Tax Avoidance
Technique, SOC. EUR. (July 4, 2018), https://www.socialeurope.eu/apple-ireland-and-thenew-green-jersey-tax-avoidance-technique [https://perma.cc/FSL5-WS6K].
72. Sarah McCabe, New Loophole to Replace the ‘Double Irish’ Tax Strategy,
INDEPENDENT.IE (Nov. 8, 2014), https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/new-loopholeto-replace-the-double-irish-tax-strategy-30728951.html [https://perma.cc/5UZN-K578].
73. Id. (“The findings, reported in the National Tax Journal, pour cold water on hopes
that the abolition of the Double Irish in Budget 2015 will clamp down on multinational
tax avoidance and restore the reputational damage repeated corporate tax scandals have
caused Ireland.”).
74. Billy O’Halloran, Revenue to Close ‘Single Malt’ Loophole, IRISH TIMES (Nov.
27, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/revenue-to-close-single-malttax-loophole-1.3712238 [https://perma.cc/5F2J-VKWV].
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The better favored successor to ‘double Irish’ has been the Capital
Allotments for Intangible Assets (“CAIA”) system. Already used by Apple,
CAIA introduces a system from the traditional BEPS tools that have
drawn fire from the European Union. 75 Under CAIA, an Irish subsidiary
still buys intangible assets (these are the same IP assets used in both other
tax avoidance tools) from its foreign headquarters.76
But, whereas previous systems used tax treaties to shift profits, CAIA
allows companies to use intangible assets, purchased in multi-billion dollar
chunks, as a giant, multi-year tax deductions against revenues generated
in the European Union and moved to Ireland.77 In essence, CAIA allows
an Irish subsidiary to buy, for example, $100 billion worth of intangible
assets from its American parent company and subsequently use that $100
billion purchase as a monstrous deduction against $100 billion worth of
profit earned in the European Union, creating a net-zero tax obligation in
Ireland.
Through CAIA, a multinational company operating under the system
can use the deduction’s now 80% coverage78 of international profits to reach
an effective tax rate of 2.5%.79 To date, Microsoft80 and Apple81 have most
notably taken advantage of the CAIA BEPS tool, and more companies
will undoubtedly structure their business models to fit the CAIA system
until the profit shifting loopholes are closed and tax crediting schemes end.

75. Patrick Smyth, Explainer: Apple’s €13bn tax appeal has huge implications,
IRISH TIMES (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/explainer-apples-13bn-tax-appeal-has-huge-implications-1.4017044 [https://perma.cc/7LKE-96G2].
76. Clancy, supra, note 71.
77. Clancy, supra, note 71.
78. Tax break for Irish IP transfers is cut to 80pc, INDEPENDENT.IE (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.independent.ie/business/budget/tax-break-for-ip-transfers-is-cut-to-80pc-362
15540.html [https://perma.cc/XRP2-UEE6].
79. Ireland As A European Gateway Jurisdiction For China—Outbound and Inbound
Investments, M ATHESON (2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20180712182634if_/http://
www.matheson.com:80/images/uploads/documents/China_Article_-_March_2013.pdf
(“The tax deduction can be used to achieve an effective tax rate of 2.5% on profits from
exploitation of the IP purchased. Provided the IP is held for five years, a subsequent disposal of
the IP will not result in a clawback.”).
80. Mark Paul, Microsoft moves $52.8bn of assets and its Asian trading operation
to Ireland, IRISH TIMES (May 25, 2019), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/
microsoft-moves-52-8bn-of-assets-and-its-asian-trading-operation-to-ireland-1.3903630?
mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2F
business%2Ftechnology%2Fmicrosoft-moves-52-8bn-of-assets-and-its-asian-tradingoperation-to-ireland-1.3903630 [https://perma.cc/5ELK-W2MK].
81. Brad Setser, Ireland’s Statistical Cry for Help, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFS.
(Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/blog/irelands-statistical-cry-help [https://perma.cc/
2PTY-LTNZ] (“Apple pioneered this structure when Apple Ireland borrowed funds from
Apple Jersey to, more or less, buy the IP rights that had been assigned to Apple Jersey (hat
tip to the reporters who worked through the Paradise Papers).”).
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B. EU Fair Competition Laws
It seems reasonable to believe that Ireland will not stop manipulating its
corporate tax policy on its own volition. This means that extra-governmental
pressure and action from the European Union is likely necessary to change
Ireland’s tax-avoiding nature. However, in order to address any of Ireland’s
corporate tax issues, the EU, acting in its role as Europe’s supra-governmental
authority, must find a basis for action grounded in the treaties forming the
constitutional basis of the Union.
First, the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (“EC
Treaty”) was signed in 1957, establishing a common European market by
“[eliminating] the barriers which divide Europe.”82 Article 2 of the EC Treaty
established the common market to facilitate “the harmonious development of
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, increased economic
stability, a rise in the standard of living in Europe and closer relations among
Member States.”83
Notably, the EC Treaty prescribes that the European Commission, an
executive body composed of an individual representative from each member
state,84 retains both the power to remove obstacles to the economic
harmonization of member states and the power to introduce legislation
aimed to promote member state economic harmonization from the top
down.85 Chapter 3 of the EC Treaty codifies the Commission’s empowerment
to take legal steps maintaining the fair functioning parity of the Union’s
economic affairs, including the ability to review and act on the legality of
a member state’s conduct within the common market.86 This empowerment,
however, requires unanimous approval from the European Commission,
meaning that Ireland’s representative could veto any action that could negatively
impact Ireland’s economy.87 Without unanimity, the Commission cannot
issue legally binding directives, regulations, or administrative actions to

82. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, at art. 1, 258 U.N.T.S.
11 (1958), amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169 1, (effective July 1, 1987), [hereinafter
EC Treaty], https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_3_antlasmalar/1_3_1_
kurucu_antlasmalar/1957_treaty_establishing_eec.pdf [hereinafter EC Treaty].
83. Id. art. 2.
84. European Commission [EC], DEVEX, https://www.devex.com/organizations/
european-commission-ec-52542. [https://perma.cc/2WL7-UQ5X].
85. Blue, supra note 52, at 456–57.
86. EC Treaty, supra note 82, art. 100.
87. EC Treaty, supra note 82, art. 101.

387

NELSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/10/2022 9:10 AM

curtail a member state’s actions if that conduct “directly affect[s] the
establishment or functioning of the common market.”88
Second, the European Union’s Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 modernized
the Union’s governing apparatus.89 The treaty, which updated both the EC
Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, centralized
the union’s regulations, foreign policy, and centralized leadership.90 It
also streamlined new methods through which the EU could act against the
economic practices of non-compliant member states.91 Specifically, Section
2 of the treaty addresses economic aids granted by states and provides for
the intervention of the European Commission in actions by member states
that are not “compatible with the internal market.”92 Specifically, article
107 defines illegal state aid as:
Save otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible
with the internal market.93

Most importantly in Ireland’s case, article 108 of the Treaty of Lisbon
sheds the EC Treaty’s requirement of unanimous commissioner approval
before the European Commission can act against states distorting the
market.94 This regulatory loosening increases the supervisory ability of
the Commission, allowing it to combat the actions of member states trying
to create an economic advantage at the expense of other member states.
The Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the EU’s ability to involve itself in
the economic affairs of member states. In fact, the Treaty adds language
applicable to Ireland’s current situation: how the European Commission
approaches incongruent or illegally competitive taxation.95 The Commission
can “issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or
administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the
establishment or functioning of the internal market.” 96 In fact, most EU

88. EC Treaty, supra note 82, art. 115.
89. Fact Sheets on the European Union: The Treaty of Lisbon, European Parliament, 2
(last updated 2020). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.5.pdf.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 107, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, (effective Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Treaty
of Lisbon].
93. Id.
94. Id. art. 108.
95. EC Treaty, supra note 82, arts. 95–100.
96. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 92, art. 115.
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competition infringement actions in the realm of tax management originates
from these directives.97
Overall, the power given to the European Commission in the EC Treaty
and Treaty of Lisbon directly effects Ireland’s tax and economic policy.
Although the European Commission might not be able to directly block
Irish legislation because of the Treaty’s unanimous approval requirement,
the empowerment enshrined in the later Treaty of Lisbon allows the
Commission to directly act against Ireland’s tax policy by utilizing the
European justice system.
C. European Case Law
Two important pieces of modern, post-Eurozone crisis, post-Treaty of
Lisbon case law speak to the European Union’s growing ability to take
direct action against member states it alleges to have distorted competition
in the common market. They also illustrate the European Commission’s
wariness of Ireland’s commitment to the ideological underpinnings of the
European Union while simultaneously remaining a tax haven.
First, the European Commission’s 2016 investigation on illegal state aid
accused the Republic of Ireland of giving the Apple Group, operating
in Europe as Apple Sales International (“ASI”) and Apple Operations Europe
(“AOE”), over $13 billion U.S.D. in illegal state aid in the form of a
BEPS-fueled near-zero tax rate between January 1991 and May 2007.98
Although the ruling did not specifically cite Article 107 of the Treaty
of Lisbon, the European Commission’s wording directly draws upon the
Article’s mandate to combat potential and real distortions in the common
market.99 Specifically, the Commission stated:

97. Fact Sheets on the European Union: Direct Taxation: Personal And Company
Taxation, EUROPEAN P ARLIAMENT (last updated 2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
factsheets/en/sheet/80/direct-taxation-personal-and-company-taxation [https://perma.cc/
PB2B-F49V].
98. European Commission Press Release IP/16/2923, State aid: Ireland gave illegal
tax benefits to Apple worth up to €13 billion (Aug. 30, 2016) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_2923 [https://perma.cc/YP2J-K92A] [hereinafter Apple Tax
Decision].
99. See id.
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As a matter of principle, EU state aid rules require that incompatible state aid is
recovered in order to remove the distortion of competition created by the aid. There
are no fines under EU State aid rules and recovery does not penalise the company
in question. It simply restores equal treatment with other companies. 100

The European Commission’s action marked the first time that Irish
corporate tax policy ran afoul of the EU’s principles of the common market
to the point where direct action was needed to correct the state of affairs.101
The specific BEPS-fueled tax rate provided by the Irish government to the
Apple Group subsidiaries was based on the original ‘double Irish’ BEPS
tool, cutting the headline corporate tax rate well below the headline 12.5%.102
Although the EU’s legal challenge focused on a secret deal between the
Irish executive and Apple’s controlling members to provide specific aid
to Apple’s profit stream,103 the action nonetheless illustrated the resolve
of the European Commission to start acting against tax avoiders and the
state-sponsored schemes aiding their avoidance. Furthermore, the retroactivity
of the Commission’s decision—attributing their €13 billion back tax
judgment to a BEPS tool that was phased out two to three years before the
Commission’s 2016 decision—displayed the EC Treaty’s and the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union’s (“TFEU”) temporal reach.104
The Commission’s decision undoubtedly sent a resounding message that
it was willing to challenge the autonomy of any tax system it perceives as
harmful to internal competition.105
The second piece of case law is the consequent reversal of the European
Commission’s decision on Ireland’s illegal state aid by the European General
Court in early 2020. In Ireland v. Commission, the Republic of Ireland directly
challenged the European Commission’s ruling that the Irish authorities
subverted Article 107 of the Treaty of Lisbon. 106 Ireland, along with the
Apple subsidiaries implicated in the European Commission’s original
ruling, argued the Commission could only make a showing that the tax set
up provided to Apple was selective in nature and not that it was created to
purposely distort the common market or provide the Apple subsidiaries

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The infographics provided by the European Commission details a system of
profit shifting that all but describes the Double Irish, and later Single Malt, corporate tax
avoidance schemes to create an actual tax rate of 1% for Apple and its subsidiaries by
2003. See id. This actual rate falls well below the state-advertised 12.5% headline corporate tax
rate. See also Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 5.
103. Apple Tax Decision, supra note 98.
104. Apple Tax Decision, supra note 98.
105. Rita Barrera & Jessica Bustamante, The Rotten Apple: Tax Avoidance in Ireland,
32:1 THE INT’L TRADE J., 150, 158–59 (2018).
106. Case T-778/16, Ireland v. Comm’n, 2020 E.C.R.
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with a competitive advantage within the European technologies market.107
More specifically, Ireland based its plea before the court on the grounds
that Article 107’s safeguards against market distortion and Article 108’s
protections against illegal state aid jointly created a burden of proof
requiring the Commission to prove any state aid provided in the form of
tax benefits was to provide a specific advantage to an entity rather than a
selective benefit;108 the former being a violation of the Treaty of Lisbon,
but not the latter.109
Ultimately, the European General Court annulled the European Commission’s
€13 billion fine against Apple because the Commission could not satisfy
the court’s burden of proof for violations of Article 107/108 of the Treaty
of Lisbon.110 The decision did not come without caveats. Most importantly,
the court’s explanation that the Commission was correct in its conclusion
that any similar violation committed by Ireland of Article 107 would originate
from the ordinary rules of the Irish corporate tax code under the TCA.111
This assertion by the court effectively rubber-stamped the Commission’s
suspicion that the TCA might have been, and could continue to be, a
source of potential violations of the Treaty of Lisbon’s protections on fair
competition.112
D. The United States’ 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
The last piece of applicable law underscores the diminishing longevity
of Ireland’s current corporate taxation scheme. While an American law
may seem slightly out of place, the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”)
creates specific predicaments for Ireland because around 80% of all Irish
corporation and business taxes are paid by American companies,113 a percentage
dominated by American companies that contribute to the majority of Ireland’s

107. Id. ¶¶ 133–37.
108. Id. ¶¶ 133–34.
109. Id. ¶¶ 134.
110. European Commission Press Release, IP/90/20, The General Court of the European
Union annuls the decision taken by the Commission regarding the Irish tax rulings in favor
of Apple (July 15, 2020).
111. Case T-778/16, Ireland v. Comm’n, 2020 E.C.R., ¶ 163.
112. See id.
113. Irish Tax & Customs, Corporation Tax 2017 Payments and 2016 Returns, IR.
GOV’T. & EVALUATION SERV. 1, 2 (Apr. 2018), https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/
documents/research/ct-analysis-2018.pdf [hereinafter Irish Tax & Customs].
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GDP.114 In fact, these companies employ over 180,000 Irish workers115
and twenty-five of the top fifty Irish companies in 2017 were American
companies that directly contributed to wages, capital spending,116 and 80%
of the corporate tax revenue injected into the Irish economy.117
This economic contribution, however, artificially inflated the power
and strength of the Irish economy. 118 For example, a double-digit rise in
Ireland’s GDP in 2015 was not a sign of a booming Irish economy,119 but
was instead attributable to a rise in corporate inversions during the Obama
era.120 The TCJA does not make profit shifting or corporate inversion an
illegal practice for American companies; rather, it changes the incentives
surrounding each practice.121
The TCJA changes many features of the US tax code once utilized by
multinational corporations to avoid paying American taxes on a majority
of their profits. First, the act reduces the headline federal tax rate from
35% to 21% as part of a broader effort by Congress to attract corporate
capital back to American shores.122 This reduction in the headline rate is
coupled with a broader shift from a worldwide tax system to a hybrid territorial
tax system, which is a dramatic change from American tax policy since
the 1960s.123 Under this new system, foreign prophets incur a “one time

114. Dan MacGuill, FactCheck: How Much Do Multinationals Actually Contribute
in Taxes?, THEJOURNAL.IE (Sept. 9, 2016, 7:07 PM), https://www.thejournal.ie/multinationalstax-contribution-ireland-facts-2972139-Sep2016/ [https://perma.cc/9NR8-LFHN].
115. Facts & Figures, AM . CHAMBER OF COM . IR., https://www.amcham.ie/aboutus/us-ireland-business/stats-facts.aspx [https://perma.cc/48E4-LYQN].
116. Ireland’s Economic and Competitiveness Update Q1 2018, IDA IR. (2018),
https://www.idaireland.com/IDAIreland/media/docs/resources/infographics/IDA_Updat
e_Q1-18_1.pdf?ext=.pdf.
117. Irish Tax & Customs, supra note 113, at 1.
118. David Jolly, Ireland, Home to U.S. ‘Inversions,’ Sees Huge Growth in G.D.P.,
N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/business/dealbook/
ireland-us-tax-inversion.html [https://perma.cc/YW9R-YZCE] (“And Ireland’s economy,
while still growing, is hardly the robust economic engine the double-digit rate of last year
would imply. The country’s G.D.P. expanded at an annual rate of 2.3 percent in the first
quarter of 2016.”).
119. Id.
120. Cliff Taylor, Ireland’s GDP figures: Why 26% Economic Growth is a Problem,
IRISH TIMES (July 15, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/
ireland-s-gdp-figures-why-26-economic-growth-is-a-problem-1.2722170 [https://perma.cc/
U9Z9-URZ8].
121. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
122. See id. Before 2017, the United States had a corporate tax rate of 35%. Pricewater
houseCoopers, United States – Corporate - Taxes on corporate income, WORLDWIDE TAX
SUMMARIES (Feb. 1, 2022), https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/united-states/corporate/taxeson-corporate-income [https://perma.cc/9LAV-3TFM].
123. Barry, supra note 38, at 327–28.
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toll charge . . . whether or not the funds are repatriated to the US.” 124
Under the former worldwide tax system, a company would be taxed at the
US corporate tax rate no matter where it earned its income.125 If a company
earned that income in a foreign country with a lower tax rate, the company
would be subject to paying the difference between the foreign country’s
tax rate and the US corporate tax rate on all income returned to the United
States.126
Furthermore, the TCJA creates what scholars call the “participation
exemption” which exempts corporations from domestic American taxation
when their foreign profits are paid back to their American parent companies.127
Nearly 80% of the foreign-taxed income paid back to American parent
companies can be eligible for double taxation relief, with the ineligible
repatriated profits subject to a lower-than-headline corporate tax rate of
13.1%.128 The TCJA’s incentives regarding the repatriation of foreign
capital have the potential to start a stream of tangible asset movement back
to the United States, away from the coffers of subsidiaries in foreign states.129
If this comes to fruition, foreign states whose gross domestic product
(“GDP”) figures have so far benefited from the artificial increase created
by non-repatriated foreign revenues may see their purported economic success
fall to more realistic terms.130
The TCJA rounds out its major changes by incentivizing US-parented
corporations to hold their intangible assets, including IP holdings, in the
United States, thus making them eligible for tax deductions on sales and
services to foreign parties.131 Overall, the TCJA’s writers aimed to create
a new-age system of corporate taxation and encourage repatriation of
American corporate holdings and assets.132

124. Barry, supra note 38, at 332; see Sedona L. Clothier, Relationships between
Corporate Inversions and the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act (Spring 2019) (Honors Thesis, University
of New Hampshire).
125. Clothier, supra note 124, at 3.
126. Clothier, supra note 124, at 3.
127. Clothier, supra note 124, at 10.
128. Barry, supra note 38, at 333.
129. Barry, supra note 38, at 322–33.
130. Barry, supra note 38, at 337.
131. Barry, supra note 38, at 333.
132. See David Perdue, IMPACTS OF THE US ECONOMY ON IRELAND: A QUANTITATIVE
AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 13 (2015) (“However now that the parent/intangible asset is
here, there is no royalty import and Ireland’s exports and GDP are artificially inflated . . .
While it is not known which exact companies caused the distortions, it is clear US
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The TCJA’s consequences for the Republic of Ireland are apparent. The
repatriation of tangible assets to the United States could negatively affect
Ireland’s GDP, a measure which is, in large part, artificially inflated by
holdings kept in Ireland by American corporations.133 Losing the artificial
inflation of Ireland’s current GDP numbers could make companies more
worried that they are investing in a weaker economy.
However, this repatriation of corporate capital may not result in a
detrimental repatriation of IP rights that are so vital to Irish subsidiaries
under Ireland’s BEPS tools. In regards of IP location,
[E]ven if the US export subsidy for IP-intensive goods and services is deemed
compatible with WTO rules, the margin associated with locating IP assets in
Ireland will not disappear. Irish-located IP, furthermore, can be used to blend
away the tax disadvantages of choosing to locate some IP or global intangible
income close to where R&D is undertaken in higher-tax European economies.134

This means that even if there is a repatriation of corporate capital to American
shores, American corporations are not being highly incentivized to remove
Irish-located IP.
Whether the TCJA will remain in force under the Biden administration
or deliver the desired long-term benefits envisioned by the Trump administration
is yet to be seen. Nevertheless, the TCJA does not seem to create substantial
barriers that would affect the Irish government’s corporate pandering. In
fact, the TCJA likely gives the Irish government a new opportunity to
modernize it FDI attraction techniques to better fit the tax needs of American
companies rather than the needs of Irish people and social services.
E. A Note on Brexit
One important issue that this Comment has not addressed is the issue of
Brexit. Ireland and the United Kingdom share a deeply complicated history
and have become vastly economically intertwined in the 30 years since
the Irish economy began truly growing in the beginning of the 1990s.
Ireland and the United Kingdom are part of a joint common travel area,
similar to the Schengen Area, and traditionally enjoyed beneficial trade
agreements.135 Companies from the United Kingdom make up the second
multinationals have played a role. One reason for the reclassification of multinational
companies as being resident in Ireland is the use by some US firms of tax inversions.”).
133. Irish GDP makes a strong start to 2019; 2018 growth revised up to 8.2%,
REUTERS (July 11, 2019, 3:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ireland-economygdp/irish-gdp-makes-strong-start-to-2019-2018-growth-revised-up-to-8-2-idUSS8N22
500X [https://perma.cc/37LY-5JGE]; OECD, IRISH GDP UP BY 26.3% IN 2015? 1 (2016).
134. Barry, supra note 38, at 336–37.
135. What is the common travel area?, UK IN A CHANGING EUR., https://ukandeu.ac.uk/
the-facts/what-is-the-common-travel-area/ [https://perma.cc/H9V6-9G7L].
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largest group of economic contributors in the Republic of Ireland behind
American corporations.136 It is reasonable to believe that these companies,
like their American counterparts, will need their Irish offices to act as their
connection to the European Union now more than ever. The situation for
these UK-borne companies is similar to that of American companies in
that Ireland is their best option for a culturally synchronistic, Englishspeaking, willing and able workforce. In other words, the opportunity cost
for these companies, should they move from Ireland after the proposed
tax reform, would be high enough to dissuade them from closing down
their Irish operations in favor of a different jurisdiction. Overall, however,
the uncertainty surrounding Brexit makes Ireland’s situation with the UK
very fluid and difficult to discern in the short term and long term.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The Irish Tax Code Fails to Benefit the Irish People
The Republic of Ireland economically trudged its way through a large
part of the 20th century.137 The booming economy of the Celtic Tiger from
the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s finally gave hope to the Irish people that
there was potential for a stronger economy than the abject mediocrity they
had been subjected to in previous decades.138 However, this idea of “the
good times” created a dangerous precedent that effectively justified the Irish
government’s low corporate tax policy on a micro-socioeconomic level.
Globalization consistently drives increasing levels of financial wealth
into the hands of a concentrated percentage of individuals.139 At the national
level, globalization has graduated formerly low-income countries with less

136. Top 1000 Irish Businesses, IRISH TIMES, http://www.top1000.ie/companies.
137. John Fitz Gerald, Understanding Ireland’s Economic Success 2 (Econ. Soc.
Research Inst., Working Paper No. 111, 1999), https://www.esri.ie/system/files?file=media/
file-uploads/2015-07/WP111.pdf (“When a major history of Ireland in the 20th century
was first published a decade ago (Lee, 1989) one of the many interesting questions addressed
was why Ireland was an economic failure.”).
138. Angelique Chrisafis, Celtic Tiger roars again - but not for the poor, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 6, 2004), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/07/ireland [https://perma.cc/
J2UN-HUFG] (“Ireland, once one of the poorest countries in Europe, could become one
of the richest in the EU, according to Dan McLaughlin, the N/A.chief economist at the
Bank of Ireland. He said employment would rise by 50,000 a year and Ireland would have
to lure workers from the EU’s latest members in eastern Europe.”).
139. Ricardo Fuentes-Nieva & Nicolas Galasso, WORKING FOR THE FEW: POLITICAL
CAPTURE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 5 (2014).
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overall inequality, like Ireland, into middle-income status with increasing
levels of overall inequality, driving a “wedge between the haves and have
nots.”140 The Celtic Tiger, for example, helped drive Ireland to becoming
one of the richest countries in Europe on paper, but in the process pushed
Ireland’s capital, Dublin, into becoming the most expensive city in Europe.141
The gap between rich and poor grew so much that the UN reported that
Ireland had the highest levels of inequality of all western countries except
the US.142 The boom’s on-paper benefit never really trickled down to the
common Irishperson:
In spite of its new-found prosperity, Ireland has the highest proportion of people
at risk of poverty in the EU. Some single parent families survive on less than €150
a week. Many say they can’t pay for their children to go to the doctor when they
are sick. The elderly, disabled and young are particularly at risk, while immigrants
who arrived with the boom often live in appalling conditions. A European report
released last week said one in five Irish people was classed as poor: taking home
less than 60% of the average wage. The OECD puts the poverty level at about
15%.143

This resounding inequality was not confined to the early 2000s. From
1980 to 2012, the share of national income going to the richest one percent
of the Irish economy nearly doubled from around 5% to around 11%. 144
“American multinationals made more profits in Ireland in 2017 than in six
of the world’s largest economies combined,” according to official data
from Caín agus Custaim Ba hÉirann (Ireland’s Office of Custom and Tax).145
Economic analysis conducted by the Irish government in 2019 further showed
that American multinationals reported $83 billion U.S.D. in profits in
Ireland alone, constituting over 30% of the profit made by American
multinationals in the European Union.146 From 1995 to 2015, Ireland “benefited
from $277 [billion U.S.D.] (£182bn) of US direct foreign investment in
the past two decades,”147 creating a seemingly obvious depiction of economic
prosperity within the country.
Despite the outstanding volume of capital running through Ireland,
there are still social and fiscal crises that “centre on those who have little
140. Id. at 6–7.
141. Chrisafis, supra note 138.
142. Chrisafis, supra note 138.
143. Chrisafis, supra note 138.
144. Fuentes-Nieva & Galasso, supra note 139, at 6.
145. David Chance, US firms make $83bn profits in Ireland, INDEPENDENT.IE (Aug.
27, 2019), https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/us-firms-make-83bn-profits-in-ireland38439416.html [https://perma.cc/6A7J-4CL8].
146. Id.
147. Henry McDonald, 700 US companies now located in Ireland as direct investment
soars, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/05/
ireland-attracts-soaring-level-of-us-investment [https://perma.cc/DBX7-EG9N].
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or no connections to multinationals [sic] firms.”148 The Republic of Ireland
remains one of the most socioeconomically unequal countries in Europe.149
One in six people in Ireland live on an income below the poverty line.150
23% of children in Ireland, roughly one in four, lives in a household
deprived of two or more basic necessities and 8.8% of children are living
in consistent poverty.151 Travellers, a nomadic indigenous ethnic minority
in Ireland, were left out of the Celtic Tiger financial boom of the mid-2000s
and still suffer from a drastically shorter life expectancy and higher infancy
mortality rate than the general Irish population.152 In fact, evidence from
2007, the height of Ireland’s Financial prosperity before the global financial
crisis showed that “some 50 per cent of Travellers die before their 39th
birthday and some 70 per cent fail to live past the age of 59.”153 Unfortunately,
this health inequality continues to affect the Traveller community.154 The
empirical socioeconomic evidence begs the question whether the phenomenal
amount of foreign direct investment provided by multinational corporations
should be taxed more heavily to effectively contribute to improving the
health, viability, and socioeconomic solvency of the people of the Republic
of Ireland. Even the European Union’s economics commissioner, Pierre
Moscovici, raised similar sentiment after Ireland’s decision to appeal the
148. See, e.g., Sheila Killian, Where’s the harm in tax competition? Lessons from US
multinationals in Ireland, CRITICAL P ERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING 13 (2005), https://
ulir.ul.ie/bitstream/handle/10344/3090/Killian_2006_tax.pdf?sequence=2 [https://perma.cc/
23YE-TWAR].
149. Carl O’Brien, Ireland at risk of reaching US levels of income inequality, says
study, IRISH TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015, 11:33 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/socialaffairs/ireland-at-risk-of-reaching-us-levels-of-income-inequality-says-study-1.2105125
[https://perma.cc/A5YW-FKGK] (“It is one of a series of findings by the think-tank Tasc,
which warns that income inequality will edge closer to US levels unless there are changes
in economic and social policy. The research says Ireland is now the most unequal country
in the EU when it comes to how the economy distributes income, before taxes and social
welfare payments are included.”).
150. Sean Healy, 760,000 people in Ireland are poor. That’s one in six of us, IRISH
EXAMINER (Apr. 15, 2019, 01:00 AM), www.irishexaminer.com/opinion/commentanalysis/arid30917661.html [https://perma.cc/9FX2-CJQU].
151. Id.
152. Killian, supra note 148, at 13.
153. 50% of Travellers die before 39 - study, IRISH TIMES (June 25, 2007, 01:00 AM),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/50-of-travellers-die-before-39-study-1.808703 [https://
perma.cc/A385-NRDN].
154. Safa Abdalla et al., Social inequalities in health expectancy in the contribution
of mortality and morbidity: the case of Irish Travellers, 35.4 J. PUB. HEALTH 533, 537–39
(2013), https://academic.oup.com/jpubhealth/article/35/4/533/1685437 [https://perma.cc/
X6VB-JQPZ].
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European Commission’s Apple tax case decision, saying: “It is a strange
decision, in a way, to say ‘I don’t want your €13 billion’ when you could
have some social programmes or economic programmes [funded] in a
country that has been damaged by a crisis, but that’s their own will.”155
While it may seem counterintuitive to tax competition enthusiasts, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”)
warned as early as 1998 that low tax rate policies used to attract foreign
capital has the potential to erode national tax bases, alter the structure of
taxation itself, and hamper the application of taxes and their redistributive
goals.156 Between 2014 and 2021, Ireland’s annual corporate tax revenue
increased from €4 billion annually to €12 billion annually.157 However,
this revenue barely touches the €61 billion in public spending the Irish
government stated would be necessary to fund necessary social and economic
programs within the country in 2018. 158 Such short-changing hugely
affects the long-term viability of publicly funded institutions such as the
Irish Health Service Executive (“HSE”), 159 funding for homelessness
protection, rural farming and agrarian subsidies, and more.160 In fact, the
€13 billion fine levied by the European Commission against Apple is itself
equivalent to the average annual amount allotted in the Irish budget to the
HSE.161
This is not to say that the respective internal allocation of tax funds in
Ireland is properly appropriated. It is, however, proof aiding the rational
accusation that the amount of tax revenue generated from the annual profits
earned by multinational corporations in Ireland does not come close to

155. Suzanne Lynch, Irish appeal of Apple ruling a ‘strange decision’, says
Moscovici, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016, 08:57 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/
economy/irish-appeal-of-apple-ruling-a-strange-decision-says-moscovici-1.2785431 [https://
perma.cc/4LF5-89H3].
156. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV. [OECD], HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 14 (1998).
157. Liz Alderman, Ireland’s Days as a Tax Haven May Be Ending, but Not Without
a Fight, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/08/business/irelandminimum-corporate-tax.html [https://perma.cc/AJ37-V844].
158. GOV’T OF IR., DEP’T OF FIN., BUDGET 2018: ECONOMIC AND FISCAL OUTLOOK (2017),
http://budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2018/Documents/Budget_2018_Economic_and_Fiscal_Out
look.pdf.
159. Barrera & Bustamante, supra note 105, at 7 (“The €13 billion that Apple owes
is ‘the equivalent of the annual budget for Ireland’s health service . . . .’”).
160. Brian O’Boyle, How tax haven Ireland has undermined our democracy and
public services, IRISH INDEPENDENT (Dec. 8, 2021), https://www.irishexaminer.com/
opinion/commentanalysis/arid-40761102.html [https://perma.cc/5AJM-74F2].
161. Sean Farrell & Henry McDonald, Apple ordered to pay €13bn after EU rules
Ireland broke state aid laws, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2016/aug/30/apple-pay-back-taxes-eu-ruling-ireland-state-aid [ https://perma.cc/
7RTV-EN5M].
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proportionately contributing to the annual fiscal figure needed to balance
the Irish budget.
B. The Irish Tax Code Holds Ireland Captive to the
Wants of Corporations
Ireland, under its current corporate tax regime, meets international
standards for a financially captured tax haven state.162 Captured states are
flexibly defined as tax havens or lower-tax jurisdictions where the national
government’s prioritization of maintaining the state’s tax haven status
allows multinational corporations to influence the affairs of state so as to
dissuade or destroy any policies that may negatively affect the financial
status quo.163 In Ireland’s context, its focus on maintaining inflows of FDI
gives opportunities to the FDI contributors to improperly influence how
the government acts, or does not act, on financial matters.
Ireland’s captured state status is dangerous to the Irish people because
the Irish government has shown a consistent pattern of bowing to corporate
interests for the sake of maintaining the corporate/financial status quo.
The Apple tax case highlights a perfect example of the captured Irish state,
as well as how the government’s acquiescence to private interest put Ireland
in financial hot water with the European Union. At the heart of the Apple
tax case were two secret dealings between Apple Systems Ireland (“ASI”)
and the Irish government164 regarding how Apple could take advantage of
Ireland’s BEPS system without shifting profits to a subsidiary off Irish
soil.165 Apple, its subsidiaries, and the Irish tax commissioners and revenue
board, ASI received two confidential rulings from the Irish Revenue
Commissioners allowing them to use a single Irish company, split into two
branches, to shift profits for the sake of tax avoidance.166 The first branch
would be subject to the headline 12.5% corporate tax rate in accordance

162. RONEN PALAN ET AL., TAX HAVENS:HOW GLOBALIZATION REALLY WORKS 120 (2009).
163. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, ANTI-CORRUPTION HELP DESK: STARE CAPTURE 2
(Mar. 11, 2004), https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/State_capture_an_
overview_2014.pdf.
164. Apple Tax Decision, supra note 98.
165. Apple Tax Decision, supra note 98.
166. Cliff Taylor, Apple’s Irish company structure key to EU tax finding, IRISH TIMES
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/apple-s-irish-companystructure-key-to-eu-tax-finding-1.2775684 [https://perma.cc/55ZL-5DEZ].
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with Irish and EU law.167 Apple successfully lobbied that the second,
however, was treated by the Revenue Commissioners as a non-domiciled
Apple subsidiary whose revenues were not to be considered Irish-borne
capital and, thus, would only be subject to an ultra-low 0.005% tax rate.168
From 2004 to 2014, Apple used their special status to shield tens of billions
of euros of non-US profits from being taxed. 169 When the European
Commission issued its 2016 decision ordering Apple to repay €13 billion
in illegal tax incentives, the Irish government and Apple joined forces to
appeal the decision in the European General Court,170 which surprised scholars
that Ireland would reject this windfall in back-taxes.171
Apple is not the only multinational corporation to capitalize on Ireland’s
captured state status.
Global legal firm Baker McKenzie, representing a coalition of 24 multinational
U.S. software firms, including Microsoft, lobbied Michael Noonan, as [Irish] minister
for finance, to resist the [Office for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting] proposals in January 2017. In a letter to [Noonan]
the group recommended Ireland not adopt [a provision barring companies from
using contracting agents to do business without tax liability], as the changes “will
have effects lasting decades” and could “hamper global investment and growth
due to uncertainty around taxation”. The letter said that “keeping the current
standard will make Ireland a more attractive location for regional headquarters . . . .”172

Not surprisingly, Ireland did not sign up for the OECD’s tax reform
convention.173
The revelations around Baker McKenzie’s active lobbying, however, are
not the end of the story. In early 2019, a massive leak of internal documents
and communications showed that Facebook targeted politicians around
the world, including Ireland, promising further injections of FDI into countries

167. Commission Decision 2014/C of 30 August on State Aid SA (ex 2014/CP),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/253200/253200_1851004_674_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TNY7-FYFM].
168. Apple Tax Decision, supra note 98.
169. Barrera & Bustamante, supra note 105, at 4–5.
170. Paul Hannon, Irish Lawmakers Back Appeal on Apple Ruling, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/irish-lawmakers-expected-to-approveappeal-on-apple-ruling-1473256462 [https://perma.cc/9M2Z-V5DV]; John Campbell, Apple
Irish tax case appeal heard by EU court, BBC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-49724786 [https://perma.cc/66BV-5KRA].
171. Lynch, supra note 155.
172. Jack Power, Ireland resists closing corporation tax ‘loophole’, IRISH TIMES
(Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/ireland-resists-closingcorporation-tax-loophole-1.3286199 [https://perma.cc/YU6A-2FLC].
173. Id.
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who “head off ‘overly restrictive’ GDPR [privacy] legislation.”174 Most
importantly, the communications revealed that Facebook and former Irish
prime minister Enda Kenny shared a “cozy” relationship and that Mr.
Kenny was very appreciative of Facebook’s selection of Dublin as the
company’s European headquarters.175 The leak further explained that Ireland,
whose internal data protection commissioner acted for all twenty-eight EU
member states, was prepared to use his office to achieve a favorable outcome
for Facebook.176 It was later revealed that Ireland’s influence on European
privacy policy was extended to protect Google’s interests as well.177
Ireland’s pandering efforts all relate back to the country’s efforts to
attract and maintain huge inflows of FDI and corporate revenue. This strategy,
however, fails to protect the Irish people from the eternally business oriented focus of corporations whose lobbying efforts are solely intended
to protect/buffer their bottom line, not to protect the financial viability of
the Irish state and/or the individual privacy, safety, or sovereignty of the
Irish people. So long as Ireland is willing to continue its “vassalage” to
corporate interests178 for the sake of maintaining the status quo, it will add
to its history of “catering to the very companies it is supposed to oversee”179 at
the expense of its obligations to its own people and to the European Union.
As definitively stated by German political scientist Friedrich Ebert:
As a country grows more and more dependent on one source of revenue, be at
mining or aid, the government becomes less and less dependent on, and so
accountable to the people of the country. Instead, it focuses on meeting the needs of the
sector or group which is essentially supporting its ability to remain in power.
If this logic can also be applied to a relentless single-minded policy of using tax
to attract FDI, the implications for Ireland are obvious and worrying. 180

174. Carole Cadwalladr & Duncan Campbell, Revealed: Facebook’s global lobbying
against data privacy laws, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2019), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2019/mar/02/facebook-global-lobbying-campaign-against-data-privacylaws-investment [https://perma.cc/J78V-QM7X].
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Nicholas Vincour, How one country blocks the world on data privacy, POLITICO
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/24/ireland-data-privacy-1270123
[https://perma.cc/5C6Y-9MVU].
178. Cadwalladr & Campbell, supra note 174.
179. Vincour, supra note 177.
180. F RIEDRICH EBERT S TIFTUNG , THE F UTURE WE THE P EOPLE NEED 83 (Werner
Puschra & Sara Burke eds., Feb. 2013), https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/0961020130215.pdf.
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C. The Irish Tax Code Hurts Ireland’s Relationship with the EU
The European Union has been engaged in a decade-long battle against
tax avoidance.181 In doing so, the EU has pushed member states towards
more complete compliance with information exchanges, tax transparency,
and regulations deterring unfair competition. 182 The EU’s more recent
efforts have transformed from democratic attempts to harmonize data
exchanges and national tax plans to judicial proceedings against member
states whose reluctance to work through democratic channels has forced
the extra-national body to take action in the courts. Ireland has shown a
consistent pattern of resisting these harmonization attempts; behavior that
has pitted the country against its European allies.183
The EU’s plan for fighting tax evasion and avoidance is three-pronged.184
First, new legislation was adopted to strengthen the regulation of the
European banking sector, most notably through the implementation of public
disclosure requirements for key financial information. 185 The European
Parliament intended this public disclosure requirement to aid the European
Commission in ascertaining whether taxes had been paid at a reasonable
economic value in the jurisdiction where the revenue is generated.186 Second,
EU directives steadily standardized the automatic exchange of tax information
between national tax authorities, largely to combat tax dodgers and
individuals hiding behind shell corporations to evade being subject to
high-tax jurisdictions.187 In essence, these first two prongs are supposed
to work hand-in-hand to create a more seamless adjudication of where
individuals and/or corporations have, or haven’t, been taxed and whether
individuals and/or corporations are purposefully evading certain tax regimes.
Lastly, as of 2015, the European Commission has aggressively brought to
court states who, in its eyes, are affecting unfair competition within the EU
internal market by using unfair or illegal tax systems to aid multinational
corporations.188 The quick growth from legislating tax transparency to
litigating against member states illustrates the European Commission’s
and, by extension, European Union’s profound focus on leveling the tax
playing field amongst member states.

181. Oxfam International, Pulling the Plug: How to Stop Corporate Tax Dodging in
Europe and Beyond, 1 (Mar. 2015), https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/
bn-pulling-plug-corporate-tax-eu-190315-en.pdf.
182. See id. at 1.
183. Id. at 2.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 3.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2.
188. Id. at 3.
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Ireland has managed to contrast with the EU on these three points. First,
Ireland’s internal regulations keep banking, financial, and tax information
confidential.189 Furthermore, the Irish Revenue Commissioners are required
by law to maintain the confidentiality of all of their tax rulings regardless
of whether the individual, company, or corporation involved wants or cares
about confidentiality.190 In fact, the Central Bank Act of 1942 prevents the
Central Bank of Ireland from sending data intended to help the state
comply with EU information exchanges to the Revenue Commissioners,
the government officials who are supposed to report that data to the European
Commission.191 Ireland’s confidentiality provisions, however, were used
by the European Commission in the Apple tax case to spin the idea that Ireland
was an active and deliberate actor attempting to affront transparency,
democratic governance, and public accountability.192 In fact, the Irish
Revenue Commission cites the 1993 Central Statistics Act and the 1997
TCA to protect the secrecy of its internal dealings with Apple from the
European Commission’s investigation.193 This shows the Irish government’s,
and Apple’s, clear knowledge and use of Ireland’s data secrecy to circumvent
the EU’s tax transparency regulations.
It is not as though the Irish government hasn’t had the opportunity to
provide for adequate transparency by law either. The Central Bank
(Amendment) Act 2015 was passed so that certain members of the Oireachtas,
Ireland’s bicameral legislature, could gain access to confidential banking
information held by the Central Bank,194 yet the act was notably missing
any provisions amending the Central Bank Act of 1942 to give the government

189. Corporate Tax Secrecy and the State: the Apple Case in Ireland, DEBT AND
DEVELOPMENT COALITION IRELAND (Oct. 2015), https://www.financialjustice.ie/assets/
files/pdf/20151023141734.pdf [hereinafter Debt and Development Coalition Ireland].
190. Id.
191. Harry McGee, Central Bank Secrecy Law to Limit Public Disclosure; Banking
Inquiry Bill Designed to Address Major Legal Obstacle to Investigation, THE IRISH TIMES
(Jan. 26, 2015, 1:05 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/central-bank-secrecylaw-will-limit-public-disclosure-of-key-documents-1.2079188?mode=sample&auth-failed
=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fnews%2Fpolitics%2Fcentralbank-secrecy-law-will-limit-public-disclosure-of-key-documents-1.2079188 [https://perma.cc/
7GUX-W3MF].
192. Debt and Development Coalition Ireland, supra note 189.
193. MacGuill, supra note 114.
194. See Central Bank (Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act No. 1/2015) (Ir.), https://www.
oireachtas.ie/en/bills/bill/2014/108/.
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the discretion to provide the EU and OECD with at least some tax
information.195
Second, Ireland’s opposition to the European Commission’s several
illegal tax aid proceedings against the Netherlands (for aiding Starbucks)
and Luxembourg (for aiding Fiat),196 has drawn pointed responses from
European state officials and political members of the European Union.
Then-EU Commissioner, Margrethe Vestager, noted with frankness the
position of the European Commission when it handed down its illegal
state a decision in 2016, saying, “Member states cannot give tax benefits
to selected companies—this is illegal under EU state aid rules.”197 The
EU’s economics commissioner, Pierre Moscovici, issued similar sentiment,
explaining, “We will defend our point of view . . . . We know that we are
right. It’s not arbitrary . . . . We are not a politicized commission we are a
political commission with a political will, and this political will is clearly
to fight tax evasion, tax fraud and aggressive tax planning . . . .”198 Moscovici
also expounded that he would not be surprised if Luxembourg and Holland,
each embroiled in similar BEPS-tool tax avoidance cases with the EC,
associated themselves with Ireland’s apple tax appeal in the same way that
Ireland had already legally associated themselves with the European
Commission’s proceedings against Luxembourg and the Netherlands.199
After the European General Court annulled the European Commission’s
Apple tax ruling in early 2020, Vestager reiterated the Commission’s
dedication to stopping tax advantages for multinational companies.200 In
her announcement of the Commission’s submission of an appeal to the
European Court of Justice, she stated:
Making sure that all companies, big and small, pay their fair share of tax remains
a top priority for the Commission the General Court has repeatedly confirmed the
principle that, while Member States have competence in determining their
taxation laws taxation (sic), they must do so in respect of EU law, including State
aid rules . . . . We have to continue to use all tools at our disposal to ensure

195. See id.
196. See European Commission Press Release IP/15/5880, Commission Decides
Selective Tax Advantages for Fiat in Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands are
Illegal under EU State Aid Rules (Oct. 21, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/
api/files/document/print/en/ip_15_5880/IP_15_5880_EN.pdf [hereinafter European Commission].
197. Apple Tax Decision, supra note 98.
198. Lynch, supra note 155.
199. Lynch, supra note 155.
200. European Commission Press Release IP/20/1746, Statement by Executive VicePresident Margrethe Vestager on the Commission’s decision to appeal the General Court’s
judgment on the Apple tax State aid case in Ireland (Sept. 25, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/statement_20_1746/STATEMENT_
20_1746_EN.pdf.
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companies pay their fair share of tax . . . . We need to continue our efforts to put
in place the right legislation to address loopholes and ensure transparency. 201

Europe’s rhetoric is clear: states providing aid to multinational companies
in a manner contrary to the EU’s goal of ensuring fair and accurate
taxation will find themselves subject to EU action. Ireland’s consistent
support of private business tax interests will likely continue to push the
EU towards legal action, action that the Irish government will have to
defend with a disproportionate amount of individual Irish taxpayer euros
considering the already noted shortfall of corporate tax revenue compared
to Ireland’s social expenditures. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable
to conclude that the European Union will not stop once the European
Court of Justice decides the Apple tax case; it will continue its efforts until
Ireland fixes the tax loopholes detrimental to the fairness of the EU
internal market.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Close the Current Loopholes, Apply a Uniform Effective
Tax Rate, and Use the TCJA to Capitalize on
New European Investment
American corporations make up the bulk of the artificially inflated Irish
economy.202 Whether or not one agrees with this lack of corporate diversity,
the entrenchment of these corporations in Ireland’s business structure
could prove very useful should Ireland heed international advice and close
its corporate tax loopholes and/or uniformly apply corporate tax regardless of
the sector. The historically massive amount of foreign direct investment
board into Ireland by these corporations203 aids the reasonable belief that
these companies would have a difficult time finding a new headquarter
location. Not only have these corporations built business parks and headquarters
campuses in Dublin (i.e. Facebook, Google), Cork (i.e. Dell), and around
Ireland, but they have also committed themselves to massive financial
investments in one of the most highly-skilled, English-speaking, culturally

201.
202.
203.

Id.
MacGuill, supra note 114.
See Stephen Smith, FDI-Ireland’s 50 Year Overnight Success Story, IRISH
CENTRAL (May 16, 2014), https://www.irishcentral.com/business/technology/fdi-irelands50-year-overnight-success-story [https://perma.cc/3UG3-YWAC].
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synonymous job markets Europe has to offer.204 The opportunity cost of
uprooting this highly beneficial socioeconomic structure would be high
and would immediately present a problem finding a new host country
whose workforce and national culture are able and ready to work with the
complicated machination American multinational companies. Furthermore,
Ireland arguably offers the best gateway into the European market for
companies seeking a financially beneficial back to Europe.
With the recognition that the opportunity cost for corporations to move
out of Ireland is quite high, the Irish government should close the tax
loopholes of TCA and Finance Act to eliminate the availability of the
current 2.5% to 4.5% effective tax rate on IP-related revenues and uniformly
apply an across-the-board corporate tax rate between 9% to 12.5% of revenue,
more realistically towards the lower end of that scale; 9% matching Hungary’s
headline rate205 and 12.5% being the current, yet underutilized Irish headline
rate.206 Applying this uniformity would finally provide the country with
reasonably proportional tax revenues that could adequately fund Ireland’s
social, health, and fiscal programs without burdening multinational corporations
to a point where Ireland is no longer a competitively attractive option.
Furthermore, applying a uniform, non-loopholed tax rate could be truly
realizable thanks to loopholes in the TCJA. Although the ethereal effect
of the TCJA was to directly combat Irish conversions and stop the offshoring
of corporate revenues,207 quirks in the law’s language and the hybridterritorial system incentivizes American corporations to turn American IP
into Irish IP and invest in Irish infrastructure. In fact, practical application
of the TCJA allows multinational companies to avoid American taxes by
being taxed in a foreign state, barring the IRS from affecting a double

204. Ireland & US Investment, IDA IR. (May 2011), https://merrionstreet.ie/en/wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/ida-ireland-and-us-investment.pdf (“US Investment is crucial to
Ireland’s economic success. Collectively US companies have a US$165bn foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Ireland. This represents 8% of all US investment in the EU and 4.6%
worldwide. This equates to more than the total invested in the BRIC economies (Brazil,
Russia, India and China). The US accounted for 74% of Ireland’s inward investment in
2010. Irish companies directly employ 82,000 people within 227 companies in all 50 states
across the USA. The cumulative stock of Irish foreign direct investment (FDI) in the US
stood at $35bn in 2009 (American Chamber of Commerce).”).
205. Hungary Corporate – Taxes on Corporate Income, PWC (Jan. 7, 2022),

https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/hungary/corporate/taxes-on-corporate-income
[https://perma. cc/E3XA-PV4P].

206. Walsh & Sanger, supra note 12, at 5.
207. William G. Gale & Claire Haldeman, The Tax Cuts and Job Acts: Searching for
supply-side effects, ECON. STUD. AT BROOKINGS (July 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2021/07/20210628_TPC_GaleHaldeman_TCJASupplySideEffects
Report_FINAL.pdf.
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tax.208 Even though the TCJA supports the repatriation of capital to the
United States, this offshoring would do little more than remove the artificial
inflation of Ireland’s GDP. In reality, this repatriated capital would first
be taxed in Ireland at the 9% to 12.5% rate before returning to America,
giving the Irish a fair share of tax revenue and allowing American multinational
companies to completely, or near-completely, avoid American taxes.
For example, American corporations under the TCJA do not pay any
American taxes outside of a one-time low-flat repatriation rate on revenues
earned in foreign countries.209 This means that a company like Google or
Facebook can utilize Ireland as a gateway to the European Union, use the
arm’s length principle and the European Union’s freedom of capital movement
principles to have all European-based revenues taxed in Ireland and not
be subsequently subject to the American tax system. Overall, this would
allow American corporations to build bigger foundations in Europe, creating
more jobs and market potential for Irish workers without fear that establishing
a large worker base in Ireland would create t ax liabilities with the IRS
from consequential profit increases and market growth down the line.
Lastly, multinational corporations, whether American or not, should
also be reluctant to move their operations from Ireland because of the superior
access to policy making that companies already enjoy under Ireland’s
captured state status. Facebook’s influence over Ireland’s position as a
European “leader” on data privacy policy is a clear example of such access;
without such access Facebook would likely have been subject to more stringent
GDPR privacy restrictions created by Germany or France.210 Raising the
corporate tax liability for Ireland’s largest economic contributors would
arguably require political dealing, and the ethical efficacy of this political
dealing should hold some importance. But, without a certain amount of
acquiescence to the existing corporate interests with an Ireland, the influence
multinational companies already enjoy would undoubtedly work to block
any such shifting policy. Even so, the Irish government owes greatly
208. Kyle Pomerleau, A Hybrid Approach: The Treatment of Foreign Profits Under
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, TAX FOUND (May 3, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/treatmentforeign-profits-tax-cuts-jobs-act/ [https://perma.cc/HKH6-5XW6].
209. Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 2020), https://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements-us-tax-system [https://perma.cc/WA8F7W3L].
210. Naomi O’Leary, Ireland has conflict of interest in regulating tech, says Facebook
whistleblower, THE IRISH TIMES, (Nov. 9, 2021, 11:34), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/
technology/ireland-has-conflict-of-interest-in-regulating-tech-says-facebook-whistleblower1.4723559 [https://perma.cc/M3PB-WJ8V].
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outstanding duties to both its people and the European Union. Closing the
existing loopholes and applying a uniform corporate tax rate may not be
easy or popular, but it is a necessary step if Ireland is to grow into more
than a perpetual tax haven.
B. A Novelty with Potential: Ireland Could Harmonize
with Benelux States
Ireland is not the only country that the European Union has taken action
against forgiving unfair tax advantages to corporations. In October 2015,
the European Commission released a directive that Luxembourg and the
Netherlands were to each recover between €20 million and €30 million in
back taxes because of illegal corporate tax benefits provided to Fiat and
Starbucks, respectively.211 In 2016, the European Commission extended
this line of illegal state aid rulings to Belgium, ruling that the Belgian
government had provided over €35 million in illegal tax incentives to
multinational corporations.212 The Commission’s reports, documents similar
to that issued after the Commission’s investigation of Ireland’s illegal use
of state aid for Apple, detailed a set of government-led schemes mimicking
or closely related to the Irish Revenue Service’s Tax rulings for Apple and
the subsequently created Irish BEPS tools used over the past 20 years.213
If Ireland wants to bring itself in line with the EU’s harmonization
efforts without losing some or all of it beneficial tax appeal, it might
consider working with the governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands to provide a streamlined, multi-state platform of corporate
tax policy. Although Ireland has taken the brunt of the Commission’s tax
rulings (the Apple tax case covered several billion euros), each of the four
countries have experience with the EU’s modern enforcement of a legal
state aid.214 Ireland already sided with Luxembourg in opposition to the
Commission’s respective investigations,215 creating a point of commonality
that, at the very least, could act as a starting point for a unified, multistate negotiating platform. With this in mind, collaboration between Ireland
and Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) could provide
211. European Commission, supra note 196.
212. See European Commission Press Release, IP/16/42, State aid: Commission concludes
Belgian “Excess Profit” tax scheme illegal; around €700 million to be recovered from 35
multinational companies (Jan. 11, 2016). https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/
files/document/print/en/ip_16_42/IP_16_42_EN.pdf.
213. See id.
214. See Apple Tax Decision, supra note 98.
215. Colm Ó Mongáin, Ireland appeals ECJ state aid ruling against Luxembourg,
RAIDIÓ TEILIFÍS É IREANN (Feb. 20, 2020, 6:01 PM), https://www.rte.ie/news/business/
2020/0219/1116376-ireland-appeals-ecj-state-aid-ruling-against-luxembourg/ [https://
perma.cc/2LZH-4VWY].
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each country the bargaining power to approach the European Union to
find an effective, modern, and favorable solution on corporate tax policy.
The economies of the four countries have their own unique quirks, but
each economy is driven in large part by financial services and/or highskilled technologies work. 216 Each Benelux country has high English
literacy217 and their trade is conducted mainly with Europe and North
America.218 These similarities between the demographic and economic
structures of Ireland and the Benelux countries could lay the foundation
for the potential harmonization of economic interests. Specifically, and
Irish – Benelux coalition could align their respective interests in working
with the EU to find a solution to the European Commission’s continued
corporate tax investigations and regulatory actions.
Collaboration between these countries is also not a foreign prospect. In
2018, Ireland joined with Beneluxa (Benelux and Austria) to create a
collaborative platform on pharmaceutical policy.219 Belgian Minister of
Social Policy and Public Health, Maggie de Block, stated upon certification
of the collaborative union that, “Today, we are five countries joining forces,
our objective being to offer the best care possible, as soon as possible and
in a sustainable way to all our patients.”220 This pharmaceutical policy
collaboration could serve as president that Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands could work in collaboration towards achieving other
policy goals as well.
This is not to suggest that all four countries should completely harmonize
policy. Ireland’s reliance on American corporations gives it continued incentive
to retain a corporate tax rate lower than the roughly 22.65% average rate
216. See Economy of the Netherlands, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.
com/place/Netherlands/Economy [https://perma.cc/UJ3T-TNF6]; Economy of Belgium,
ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Belgium/Economy [https://perma.cc/
23BG-W9VA]; Economy of Luxembourg, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
place/Luxembourg/Demographic-trends#ref23430 [https://perma.cc/9J3F-2X2W].
217. The world’s largest ranking of countries and regions by English skills, EDUC.
FIRST, https://www.ef.edu/epi/regions/europe/ [https://perma.cc/GAL7-YL37].
218. See Economy of the Netherlands, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.
com/place/Netherlands/Economy [https://perma.cc/UJ3T-TNF6]; Economy of Belgium,
ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Belgium/Economy [https://perma.cc/
23BG-W9VA]; Economy of Luxembourg, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
place/Luxembourg/Demographic-trends#ref23430 [https://perma.cc/9J3F-2X2W].
219. Ireland joins Beneluxa initative, Press Release, GOV’T OF NETH., (June 6, 2018,
4:00 PM), https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2018/06/22/ireland-joins-beneluxainitiative [https://perma.cc/9C3V-U42B].
220. Id.
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currently used by the Benelux states.221 The heightened reliance of Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxenberg on the European market allows them to
retain higher corporate tax rates considering their major trading partners
(e.g. Germany, France, Italy) retain rates around 30%.222
Rather, this is an opportunity to utilize the collective bargaining power
of four major EU member states. Together, Ireland and Benelux could
work to create a corporate tax scheme providing companies with continued
specific relief from corporate tax without giving those companies the
opportunity to finesse the system to the detriment of social programs and
the democratic process. The Benelux Union already has “the objective of
bringing about total economic integration . . . by following a coordinated
policy in the economic, financial, and social fields . . . .”223 This means
that Ireland could potentially benefit from the power of the tri-national
union’s policy coordination.
Even though the European Commission cannot directly block the tax
policies of any of these four countries without great difficulty, 224 the
persistence of the Commission in investigating and punishing instances of
illegal state aid225 gives both the EU and the four member states impetus
to work towards a mutually agreeable solution. Ireland’s, and Benelux’s,
interests in remaining attractive FDI destinations would be in better shape
with unified negotiating power by their side. Furthermore, the vacuum
created by the United Kingdom after Brexit could allow a unified IrelandBenelux block to assume more of a rule in influencing EU policy. This
could lead to an overall negotiating power strong enough to balance, at
least in part, the EU’s overriding interest in maintaining competition in
the common market with the states’ interests in remaining attractive
financial destinations.
V. CONCLUSION
Ireland’s corporate tax avoidance is no longer a tenable position at
home or abroad. The Irish government’s lowering of the corporate tax rate
in the mid-to-late 20th century undoubtedly played its part in modernizing
221. As of 2020, Belgium used a nominal corporate tax rate of 18% while the
Netherlands used a 25% rate and Luxembourg a 24.94% rate. The average of these is about
22.65%. Elke Asen, Corporate Tax Rates around the World 2020, TAX FOUND. (Dec. 9,
2020), https://taxfoundation.org/publications/corporate-tax-rates-around-the-world/#Regional
[https://perma.cc/DQU4-CKSR].
222. Id.
223. Benelux, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Benelux [https://
perma.cc/KQ5Q-F5L5].
224. Decision Making on EU Tax Policy, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/taxation
_customs/taxation-1/decision-making-eu-tax-policy_en [https://perma.cc/J5MJ-EEAT].
225. See Apple Tax Decision, supra note 98.
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the Irish economy and has turned Ireland into one of the largest multinational
corporate hubs in the Western world. However, the stagnation of the
government’s corporate tax policy and the effective lobbying of corporate
interests has put Ireland in legal jeopardy with the European Union, has
stymied needed financial aid required for social programs and infrastructure,
and more recently has forced action from a group of nations, led under the
banner of the OECD, trying to cut Ireland’s ability to act as a tax haven.226
In the face of these pressures, Ireland has an opportunity to create a longlasting, financially beneficial solution that provides ethical, equitable corporate
tax revenues without dissuading multinational corporations from remaining
in the Irish market. Ireland’s educated, flexible, culturally similar, Englishspeaking workforce is vital for effective access to the European market,
and the Irish government should use these points to negotiate a better tax
settlement for its constituents. The foundations for tangible change are
present. If this change will occur depends on whether the Irish government
will build on these foundations or remain in the immovable confines of its
current captive state outlook.

226. The current push from OECD nations to create a flat 15% corporate tax rate
minimum solutions is presented in this comment. However, the 15% tax rate presented
does not seem to bar the special intangible asset rates Ireland has utilized to date. See Silvia
Amaro, Global tax deal inches closer as hold out Ireland agrees to sign up, CNBC (Oct.
7, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/07/ireland-corporate-tax-rate-.html [https://perma.cc/
CXG7-7DNB]. Until these special intangible asset rates are closed or amended, the Irish
government will likely continue to use them to subvert any headline corporate tax rate.
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